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Article 8

NOTES
the law building does not make the law school. The Dean appeals to
the Notre Dame lawyers in these words:
"Law is a progressive rather than an exact science. The study of
law is not limited to the learning of fixed rules. The purpose of a law
schoolr is to train the mind to comprehend the development of the
principles of law and to apply them to contemporary conduct. The
practice of law is not a business for profit, nor an occupation to exact
fees from society for clever advice. It is a profession with responsibilities to the public. It is a public trust and the lawyer is a public
servant. As a law-maker, the lawyer's duty is to make the laws just.
As a judge and advocate, his duty is to see that the law is properly
administered.
Now, you Notre Dame lawyers! The $400,000 law building does
not make the law school. The builders will have built in vain unless
within its walls the 150 young men learn to appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of a lawyer. Unless the Notre Dame Law School sends
forth legal thinkers, honest legal advisers, true law-makers, and efficient law-administrators, it will have failed to fulfill its mission. I
plead! Go forth as a Notre Dame man imbued with the Notre Dame
spirit; carry to the ranks of the profession Her teachings and Her
ideals; and thus reflect credit upon your Alma Mater as well 'as
yourself."

NOTES
AUTOMOBILEs-DUTY

OF DRIVER TO GuEsT-GuEST STATUTES.*-

In Higgins v. Mason 1 "the plaintiff, Josephine B. Higgins, her husband, Robert Higgins, and the defendant's wife, Grace Mason, were
the guests of the defendant, George Mason, Jr., on an automobile trip
from Corinth, N. Y., to Gravesville, a village near Utica, N. Y., and
return, and rode with 'the defendant in"an automobile owned and
furnished by him. On the return journey, when.aboUt twenty miles from
Corinth, the car, then driven by the plaintiff; Josephine B. Higgins,
suddenly turned to the left, crossed the road on sharp angle, entered
the left-hand ditch, and overturned. The occurrence caused the death
*See McCabe, The Duty of an Automobile Driver to a Gratuitous Guest, 6
NoT3& DAm L. (1931) 300. And see Note, 74 U. oF PENN. L. REV. (1925) 86;
and notes in 20 A. L. R. 1014, 26 A. L. R. 1425, 40 A. L. R. 1338, 47 A. L. R.
327, 51'A. L. R. 581, 61 A. L. R. 1252.
1 174 N. E. 77 (N. Y. 1930).
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of Robert Higgins. The plaintiff brings this action, as his administratrix, to recover damages for the death, charging that it was caused
by the defendant's negligence." It appeared that "on the return
journey, near Utica, seventy miles before its arrival at the place of
the accident, the automobile, driven by the defendant Mason, had
taken a 'swerve' or 'slew' from the right side to the left edge of the
macadam highway." All conceded that "it had been raining and the
road was wet." The defendant Mason said that "the car slewed because he applied the brakes to the car while on a slippery road." There
was testimony "to the effect that Mason, several days after the accident, said in reference to the swerve that 'he knew there was something wrong with the car but he did not know what'; that he 'thought
there was something wrong,' but that he thought 'they would be able
to get home'; that Grace Mason, his wife, while driving after the
swerve, called out to him, 'Papa, there is something wrong with the
car.' " It was held that the defendant was not liable for the death
of his guest because of a mechanical defect in the car, although the
defendant, by inspection, might have discovered the fault, since the
guest, in accepting the invitation to ride, must have taken the car as
he found it, and no duty of inspection rested upon the defendant. The
court said:
"Mason would be liable only if he knew of the dangerous condition;
realized that it involved an unreasonable risk; believed that the guests
would not discover the condition or realize the risk; and failed to
warn them of the condition and the risk involved .... Even if Mason

knew that something was wrong with the car, that it was 'logy' on
hills, that it did not steer well, this was far from being realization of
the fact that a serious mechanical defect, making further travel dangerous, was involved. Mason's own conduct in exposing his wife and
himself to the peril of traveling farther in the car indicates that he
was not conscious of the peril. If Mason thought the car safe for
himself, he could not have realized that it was unsafe for his guests.
Then, .also, if Mason's failure to realize that the 'something' which
was wrong with the automobile constituted a dangerous condition was
due to his lack of mechanical knowledge, that was a risk assumed
by the guests when they accepted his invitation to take the trip."
The rationale of this decision is apparent from the foregoing reasoning. The relationship that exists between an automobile owner
and a gratuitous passenger is said to be analagous to that existing
between a landowner and his guest. The court cites the Restatement
of the Law of Torts as setting forth the proper rules which govern
the case. Kellog, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, said:

NOTES
"The duty of an owner of premises to a gratiitous licensee has been
clearly stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Tentative Draft
No. 4, American Law Institute. The owner is liable for injuries caused
by a defective condition of the premises only ,if he 'knows of the condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk to them and
has reason to believe that they will not discover the condition or realize
the risk' and fails to use reasonable care to make the premises safe
or 'to warn them of the condition and the risk involved therein.' Section 212. If a host invites a guest to dine- with him at his country
place, and the road to his house has become dangerously undermined,
the host is not liable to his guest for an injury caused by a collapse
of the road, if he did not have actual knowledge that the road was
undermined, although he 'could have discovered it had he paid attention to the condition of his road.' Id. Illustrations, p. 165."
Probably the first decision in New York, and one of the first decisions in this country, defining the obligation of one who invites another
to ride in his private vehicle, toward the passenger so invited, is that
of Patnode v. Foote.2 In this case the plaintiff had been subpoenaed by
the defendant as a witness in an action to which he was a party, and
there was evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the defendant
had invited the plaintiff to ride with him to the place of trial, in "an
open buggy drawn by one horse driven by himself." The defendant
drove at a "reckless rate of speed, against the plaintiff's protest." The
defendant contended that since the plaintiff was his gratuitous passenger he owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. Houghton, J., in
delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"A person thus invited to ride stands in the same situation as a bare
licensee wlib enters upon real property which the licensor is under no
obligation to make safe or keep so but who is"
liable only for active
negligence. .

.

.The obligation of one who invites another to ride is

not as great as that of the owner of real property who invites another
thereon, especially for the purposes of trade or commerce, because,
under such circumstances, the one who gives such invitation is bound
to exercise ordinary care to keep such property reasonably safe. ...
one who invites another to ride is not bound to furnish a sound vehicle
or a safe horse. If he should have knowledge that the vehicle was
unfit for the transportation or the horse unsafe to drive, another element would arise, and he might be liable for recklessly inducing another to enter upon danger. These latter elements, however, are not
involved in the present action, and the duty of the defendant toward
the plaintiff only was to use ordinary care not to increase the danger
of her riding with him or to create any new danger."
2

153 App. Div. 494 (1912).
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These cases represent one view as to the liability of an automobile
driver for injuries to a passenger in his private car. This view,
briefly stated, is that the situation gives rise to the relation of licensor
and licensee; the owner is not bound to furnish a "sound vehicle,"
but if he knows that the car is unsafe and that it involves an unreasonable risk to the passenger *and has reason to believe that the latter
will not discover the condition or realize the risk and fails to use
reasonable care to make the car safe or to warn the passenger of the
condition and the risk involved therein the owner is liable to the
passenger for the resulting injury; it is the duty of the owner not to
increase the danger which the guest assumes upon entering the car
manned by the owner or to create any new danger, such as by fast
and reckless driving.
In the Higgins case the rules of liability existing between licensor
and licensee were applied as far as. the "condition" of the automobile
was concerned. In the Patnode case the same rules of liability were
held to be applicable in the matter of the "management" of the automobile. In the former case it would seem that the rules of liability
obtaining between licensor and licensee would establish the proper
measure of liability. There is not any fundamental difference between
an invitation extended by a person to dine with him and an invitation
to ride with him. In the one instance the guest is said to accept the
premises of his host as he finds them, in so far as the condition of the
premises is concerned. If the owner knows of a defective condition
which involves an unreasonable risk of danger to his guest and has
reason to believe that the guest will not discover the condition or
realize the risk, he owes a duty to the guest to make the premises safe
oi to warn the guest of the condition and the risk involved therein.
The guest should have no right to a greater security than that enjoyed
by the host or other members of the family. Likewise, when the
owner of an automobile invites another person to take a pleasure drive
the guest should take the car as he finds it, and the owner would
not be liable to the guest for an injury due to a defective condition
of the car unless he had reason to believe that the car was unsafe to
make the trip. In such a case liability would be based upon the defective condition of the car and not upon negligent operation thereof.
Where liability is based upon negligent operation of the car the
question of whether the rules of liability obtaining between licensor
and licensee should apply gives rise to some difficulty. Those rules
of liability were intended to apply principally with reference to the
condition of premises. May they be extended so as to apply with
reference to liability based upon negligent management of an automobile? Such is a part of the problem involved in this Note. The
larger problem is to determine the basis and scope of the common

NOTES
law duty that the driver or owner of an automobile owes to his guest
in so far as the law of negligence is concerned; and to indicate the
statutory trend. The Patnode case gave an affirmative answer. In
Clark v. Traver 3 the plaintiff, while riding as a guest in the defendant's automobile, received injuries through an accident arising, as
alleged, from the automobile being driven at an excessive speed. The
defense was contributory negligence. The court said:
"It is well established that the duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff as a licensee was to exercise ordinary and reasonable care,
not-to increase the danger of the plaintiff while thus in defendant's
car or to create any new danger. (Patnode v. Foote ....

)"

The Court of Appeals of New York does not appear to have decided
this question. There is a dictum in Rolfe v. Hemtt 4 indicating an af-

firmative answer. In.
that case the plaintiff's intestate was killed by the
overturning of an automobile in which he was riding. The car was
owned by the defendant, and at the time of the accident was being
driven by his chauffeur. Apparently the chauffeur lost control of the
car, thus causing the overturning. The court said:
"If he (the intestate) were in the car with the consent of the chauffeur
then as to him he was a licensee, but not as to the defendant."
Both the English Courts and the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York have held that a licensee (one permitted to use
the premises of another for one's own purposes) does not take the
risk of dangers superadded by the active misconduct of the host.5 The
host must take into account the probable presence of the licensee upon
those parts of the-premises to which the permission applies; and he is
under a duty not to do any act which if he "stopped to think" would
imperil the safety of the licensee if he avails himself of the permission
granted him. 6 That is to say, the landlord is liable to the licensee
for injuries due to the failure of the landlord to conduct his activities
upon the premises with reasonable care. The analogy would seem to
be well drawn. But Collins, M. R., in Harris v. Perry & Co.J takes
a different attitude:
"At all events, I think it was competent for the jury to find, as they
must be taken to have found, a failure of that ordinary care which is
due from a person who undertakes the carriage of another gratuitously.
The principle in all cases of this class is that the care exercised must
8 205 App. Div. 206 (1923). Aff'd 143 N. E. 736.
4 125 N. E. 804 (N. Y. 1920.)
5 Gallagher v. Humphrey, 6 L. T. (N. S.) 684 (Q. B. 1862); DeBoer v.
Brooklyn Wharf Co., 51 App. Div. 289 (1900). See s to liability of a railway
to a person, gratuitously but expressly invited to ride in its engine, for injuries
caused by its negligent operation, Harris v. Perry, L. R. [1903] 2 K. B. 219.
6

BOHLEN, STbhrs N

7

L. R. [1903] 2 K. B. 226.

=

LAW OF TORTS (1926)

171, 172.
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be reasonable; and the standard of reasonableness naturally must vary
according to the circumstances of the case, the trust reposed, and the
skill and appliances at the disposal of the person to whom another
confides a duty. There is an obvious difference between the measure
of confidence reposed and responsibility accepted in the case of a
person who merely receives permission to traverse the premises of
another, and in the case where a person or his property is received
into the custody of another for transportation. .. ."
In the one case it is a question of the obligation assumed by one
inviting another to come upon his land. While the extent of the obligation assumed by inviting one to ride gratis in his carriage is a
question of the liability of one who enters upon a gratuitous undertaking to carry.
Perhaps a better analogy would be the rule set forth in the Restatement of the Law of Torts 8 and supported by the cases listed in
the Explanatory Notes 9 thereto:
"If the actor takes charge of another whom the actor's non-tortious
conduct has rendered helpless, the actor is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to give the other aid or protection."
But it is said in the Comment that
"... the actor is not required to conform to a high standard of diligence and competence, to possess any special bill (skill)? or to subordinate his own interests to those of the other, to the same extent as
would be necessary if the services were obligatory or for compensation.
...Indeed, there is a strong analogy between the lack of that reasonable care which is necessary to make the actor liable in such case and
that recklessness which makes an act something more than negligence
though less than intentional injury." 10
In a jurisdiction which purports to recognize only one degree of
negligence, this rule and the comment thereto would seem to be applicable by way of analogy to the question of liability of the automobile driver to his guest. The Court of Appeals of New York, however, is definitely committed to a recognition of gross negligence in so
far as it means a failure to exercise slight diligence." In the Patnode
case the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court committed itself to the view that the driver of vehicle owes to the invited
guest the duty to use ordinary care "not to increase the danger" to the
guest "or to create a new danger," in the operation of the vehicle.
But -in that case there was evidence to warrant the jury in finding
that the defendant drove at a reckless speed. So the case is really
8
9

TNTATrVE DAr No. 4, § 197.
EXPLANATORY NOTES ON TORTS, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, p. 16.

10 Supra note 8 at 123.
11 See Weld v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 103 N. E. 957 (N. Y. 1913).

NOTES
not authority for what is 'said to 'be the general rule, viz., that an
owner or driver of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest
to exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to
12
expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel.
The decisions in the Supreme Court of Alabama 13 support the
view that the owner and driver of an automobile owes to an invitee
(express or implied) the duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of the car "not to unreasonably expose to danger and injury the
occupant by increasing the hazard of that method of travel. He must
exercise 'the care and diligence which a man of reasonable -diligence,
engaged in like business, would exercise fdr his own protection and the
protection of his family and property-a care which must be reasonably commensurate with the -nature and hazards attending this particular mode of travel." A distinction is made between the duty owed
to an invitee (whether express or implied) and the duty owed to a
mere licensee in this connection, the latter being defined as one whose
.presence in the car is merely tolerated by the driver. It is said that
the licensee assumes "all the risks of carriage except such as might
result from wanton or intentional wrong or a failure to exercise due
care to avert injury after his danger became apparent." 14 It is difficult to accept this distinction which seems, from the language of the
Supreme Court of Alabama, to turn on the fact that the licensee is in
the car for his own benefit or pleasure, the owner having no interest
or advantage in his presence. 15 The important thing in either instance,
whether the guest be expressly invited or his presence be merely
.tolerated, would seem to be that the owner has given his consent to
the presence of the guest in the car and must take that into account
in the matter of the operation of the car. 16 The Supreme Court of
Alabama does not, as a general rule, recognize but one degree of
17
negligence.
See Note, 47 A. L. R. 327.
18 Perkins v. Galloway, 69 So. 875 (Ala. 1915); Garner v. Baker, 108 So.
38 (Ala. 1926); Thomas v. Carter, 117 So. 634 (Ala. 1928). See, also, Hall v.
Slaton, 144 S. E. 827 (Ga. App. 1928), applying the Alabama rule as to an
injury that occurred in Alabama. The action was brought against the driver
to recover damages for the death of a person who was riding in the automobile
at the time of the accident. Evidence that the car was being driven at a speed
of 50 or 60 miles an hour when it ran through the timbers of a bridge was held
to be erroneously rejected as it would have authorized the inference that the
driver was not using ordinary care under the rule applicable in Alabama.
12

14

Crider v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., 89 So. 285, 286 (Ala. 1921).

15 See Crider v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., op. cit. supra note 14, at 287.
16

Compare Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 6, at 171, 172.

See Stringer v. Alabama Midland R. Co., 13 So. 75 (Ala. 1893); Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hall, 17 So. 176 (Ala. 1895).
17

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In Central Copper Co. v. Klefisch Isthe plaintiff was a member of an
"auto party," the driver of the car being "furnished by" the defendant. It appears that the defendant furnished this means of recreation to its employees, one of whom was the plaintiff, and that the
car was being used for this purpose at the time of the plaintiff's injury.
The Supreme Court of Arizona said:
"It is the law that the owner of a motor vehicle, who invites a guest
to ride with him, is bound to use reasonable and ordinary care for the
safety of the guest .... Nor is it necessary for liability that the conduct of the operator should be willful or wanton, or have amounted
to gross negligence. . . .If this be the law, much more is it so when
the invitation was extended, not as ordinary courtesy to a guest, but
for the purpose of keeping defendant's employees better satisfied
with the conditions of their employment ...it (the defendant) was
under the duty of seeing that their safety was cared for in a reasonable manner, just as if it (this means of transportation) had been
furnished as a matter of contract."
Not only does the court adopt the three degrees of negligence but
it seems, in adopting the general rule, to base the duty upon the fact
that the driver has taken the plaintiff into his custody. The purpose
of the ride is immaterial. The important thing is that the plaintiff
is in the car with the owner's permission, and the latter owes a duty
to the plaintiff not to do an act which will imperil the safety of the
plaintiff.
In Black v. Goldweber19 the plaintiff was a "self-invited" guest
in the defendant's automobile. The testimony tended to show that the
car, in which they were driving, turned over on account of fast driving
by the defendant, which resulted in the injury that the plaintiff complained of. The only question presented for the Supreme Court of
Arkansas to decide was whether the trial court- was in error in instructing a verdict for the defendant upon the theory that the only
duty he owed to the plaintiff as a self-invited guest was to refrain from
injuring her willfully or wantonly. In giving an affirmative' answer,
Humphreys, J., in speaking for the court, said:
"The trend of modern authority is to disregard this distinction (between the duty owing to an invitee and that owing to a bare licensee)
and apply the rule of duty imposed on owners and drivers of vehicles
to invitees, to self-invitees, or licensees also.. The prevailing rule ...
requires drivers of automobiles to exercise ordinary care in the operation thereof to transport their passengers safely, whether guests by
sufferance, self-invited guests, or invited guests. . . . 'He who enters
an automobile to take a ride with the owner also takes the automobile
18
19

270 Pac. 629 (Ariz. 1928).
291 S. W. 76 (Ark. 1927).

NOTES
and the driver as he finds them. But, when the owner of the automobile starts it in motion, he, as it were, takes the life of his guest
into his keeping, and in the operation of such car he must use
reasonable care not to injure any one riding therein with his knowl-

edge and consent. . .

.'

"

Hart and- Kirby, JJ., concurred in this

opinion. Yet, in a special concurring opinion, in which Kirby, J.,
concurreol, Hart, J., said:
".. . I hold to the view that, in a gratuitous carriage for the sole
benefit of the guest, the law requires only slight diligence, and makes
the owner of the automobile liable only for gross neglect."
Notwithstanding this special concurring opinion, the next year, inthe
case of Bennett v. Bell,20 Kirby, J., who delivered the opinion of the
court, purported to adopt the views set forth by Humphreys, J., in
the case of Black v. Goldweber. He made no reference to his former
opinion. But the facts in the Bennett case give rise to the inference
that there was a failure to use "slight diligence." The plaintiff was
riding in the defendant's automobile at his invitation. While driving
at a speed which the plantiff testified was 65 miles an hour, the defendant ran into some loose gravel on a.sharp curve and the car turned
over injuring the plaintiff. The latter had protested against the speed of
the car. In Gurdin v. Fisher21 it was alleged by Mrs. Millie Gurdin,
one of the plaintiffs, that she was an invited guest in an automobile
owned by one of the defendants and .driven by the other defendant as
agent of the owner; and that the driver negligently permitted the
car to leave a pavement on the trip, and without stopping the car or
slowing its speed, he negligently turned the car in such a manner as to
cause it "to wreck and turn over" thereby injuring her. She testified
that she "imagined he was driving too fast," and that he "was going
between 45 and 50 miles an hour; could not tell exactly because she
was in the back seat." Another occupant in the car testified that the
driver "was making the curves a little fast and that he cautioned
him once or twice"; and that when the car left the pavement it hit a
rut, and, "instead of using ordinary prudence in driving through that
rut, he jerked his wheel around, he jerked it all the way over and
caused the car to run completely from the right side of the road
around on the left and turned over." The court instructed the jury
that if the driver was negligent, whereby any of the passengers were
injured, he was liable, and it would make no difference whether it was
a "joint enterprise," or whether the passengers were guests by sufferance, or whether they were invited by the driver or some one else, or
self-invited. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that it' was not
error to so instruct the jury. In view of the fact that Hart and
20
21

3 S: W. (2d) 996 (Ark. 1928).
18 S. W. (2d) 345 (Ark. 1929).
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Kirby, JJ., gave the majority opinion in the case of Black v. Goldweber and in view of the facts in the Bennett and Gurdin cases the
state of the law in Arkansas is in doubt. It is not clear as to whether
the scope of the duty depends upon the question of whether the owner
of the car derives a benefit from the presence of the passenger in the
car or whether it depends upon the fact that the passenger is in the
car with the consent of the owner.
An earlier statute 22 in California permitted the guest in a vehicle
to recover for personal injuries caused by the ordinary negligence of
the driver in the operation of the vehicle. This statute was construed
in Steean v. Foster,23 a case wherein the facts seemed to establish
that the plaintiff was a self-invited guest in the defendant's automobile. This was not apparently regarded as a material factor in the
decision. The negligence that was held to constitute a violation of
the statute consisted in running into a tree while the defendant (the
driver) was looking for the switch key. This statute was said to
recognize the general common law rule. 24 But by a statute enacted
by the California Legislature in 1929 the right of a guest to recover
for personal injuries caused by the operation of the automobile in
which he is riding is made dependent upon "proof of gross negligence,
willful misconduct, or intoxication of the driver." 25 No factual situations have been discussed in connection with the application of the
statute. According to the phraseology of the statute, gross negligence
would seem to mean a failure to use slight care-a definition that has
been recognized in this jurisdiction. It might be added that a guest is
defined by the statute "as being a person who accepts a ride in any
vehicle without giving a compensation therefor." 26 Probably this will
be construed so as to include the self-invited guest; at least, it should
degrees of negligence seembe so interpreted on principle. The 2three
7
to be recognized in this jurisdiction.
The decisions in Connecticut prior to the enactment of the socalled "guest statute" in 1927 adopted the general rule prevailing at
common law in respect to an injury to the guest due to the operation
of the automobile. Wheeler, C. J., in Dickerson v. Connecticut Co.,28
discusses the doctrine thus:
22

The statute provided that a carrier of persons without reward must

use ordinary care and diligence for their safe carriage. See Sheean v. Foster,
251 Pac. 235 (Cal. 1926).
23 Op. it. 'supra note 22.
24 See Callett v. Alioto, 290 Pac. 438 (Cal. 1930).
25 Callett v. Alioto, op. cit. supra note 24.
DEEING'S GEN. LAws, SunP. 1929, Act 5128, § 141%.
26
27
28

See discussion in Walter v. Southern Pac. Co., 116 Pac. 51 (Cal. 1911).
118 AtI. 518 (Conn. 1922).

NOTES.
"The guest on entering the automobile takes it and the driver as they
then are, and accepts the dangers incident to that mode of conveyance
If the driver be intoxicated, or the automobile be defective, and the
owner does not then know this, and injury result to the guest in consequence, the owner of the automobile is not liable to him. If the
driver becomes intoxicated after the gratuitous transportation has begun, or the defect in the automobile was one which the owner knew
about and failed to inform the guest, he exposed the guest to a new
danger in the first instance,, and iii the second he was injured in
consequence of the failure of the owner to exercise toward him ordinary care to inform him as to the defect. . . . When the journey has
begun, the owner's duty is to so operate the car that no new danger
to the guest is created, and no increase is in the danger from this
mode of transportation is incurred by him. If the owner increases
the danger, or creates a new danger by the manner in which he operates the automobile, he has not exercised toward his guest reasonable
care. This would follow if he operated the car at an unreasonable
speed, or in violation of some law or municipal ordinance or regulation, or without having the car under reasonable control, or without
keeping a proper lookout, and in consequence of his conduct an
accident resulted in which the guest was injured."
This case involved the question of liability due to negligent operation of the car. 'If the injury had been due to a defective condition
,of the automobile, the dictum indicates that a result similar to the decision in the Higgins case would have followed. The decisions in this
jurisdiction purport to reject the classification of negligence made by
Lord Holt in Coggs v. Bernard2 ) and to recognize but one degree on
negligence. There is but one standard of care, so Wheeler, C. J., says
in the Dickerson case; and the jury simply
'. inquire whether the owner has exercised due care in the circumstances presented to him, and they determine this by asking what the
reasonably prudent person- would have done similarly circumstanced,
and if the owner's conduct has not measured up to this standard he
has not exercised due or ordinary care. That standard is simple and
unvarying. As the danger increases, the car6 must increase, for the
reasonably prudent man would .so act in a similar situation." 30
As to whether this is a better practical view than that adopting the
three degrees of negligence is an inquiry beyond the scope of this
Note. It seems fairly obvious that it would be if the jury received
no more than a dogmatic statement that the owner of the car was
only liable to the guest for gross neglrgence without an explanation as
to why that should be the law. A "'dogmatic statement as to what
29
3o

2 Ld. Raym. 909 (1703).
Op. cit. supra note 28 at 519.
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the law is, without stating the reason why it is so, receives but little
heed from one who does not understand why he should not as a man,
and not as a juryman, give effect to his natural sympathy for those
in distress." 31 Probably a particular description of the duty of the
owner of the car, in terms of the facts of the case, to the guest,
without stress upon words, would be a more desirable practice. It
may be doubted as to whether the "unvariable" standard of the
Connecticut court would be a better solution of the difficulty.
Under section 1, c 308, of the Public Acts of 1927, the Connecticut
Legislature limited the liability of the owner or operator of a motor
vehicle to one who was riding in it as his guest to "two classes of
cases: First, when the accident was caused by intentional misconduct;
and, second, when it was caused by heedless or reckless disregard of
the rights of others, meaning thereby something more than the mere
failure to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent man. . .. , 32 In
construing this statute, Wheeler, C. J., in Bordonaro v. Senk 33 says:
"The framers of the statute undoubtedly used the noun 'heedlessness'
in place of the adjective 'heedless' and the word 'or' for 'and.' The
phrase 'or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the
rights of others' meets the legislative intention when it is construed
to read, 'or caused by his heedless and his reckless disregard of the
rights of others.' . . Act or conduct in reckless disregard of the rights
of others is improper or wrongful conduct and constitutes wanton
misconduct, evincing a reckless indifference to consequences to the
life, or limb, or health, or reputation or property rights of another."
Therefore, no cause of action for negligence is included in the provi-

34
sions of this statute. In Ascker v. H. E. Friedman, Inc., the plaintiff

was a guest in a car driven by her sister; they were hastening to
arrive home before a threatened thunderstorm broke. They approached
the house at a rate of speed of 25 to 30 miles an hour, and the
driver turned from the street into the driveway without slackening her
speed, in her haste to get home, with the result that the car mounted
the curb and crashed into the house, injuring the plaintiff. It was
held that the driver was not guilty of operating the car with reckless
disregard of the guest's rights. Banks, J., in delivering the opinion
of the court, said:
Remarks of Simpson, J., in Cody v. Venzie, 107 Atl. 383, 385 (Pa. 1919).
Silver v. Silver, 143 Atl. 240, 242 (Conn. 1928).
33 147 Atl. 136, 137 (Conn. 1929). Accord: Grant v. MacLelland, 147 Atl.
138 (Conn. 1929). Section 1 of the Connecticut statute provides: "No person
transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without
payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against
such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such
accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator or
caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others."
34
147 Atl. 263 (Conn. 1929).
31
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NOTES
"Conduct arising from momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, ot
from an error of judgment, does not indicate a reckless disregard of
the rights of others.... The accident was the result of a momentary
bit of careless driving, a failure to use due care." 35
In Meyer v. Hart 86 the plaintiff was a guest in"
an automobile belonging to the defendant and -being driven by him down a "steep
hill over a road, where traffic was apt to be heavy," on a wet and
slippery asphalt pavement at speed of 35 miles an hour. At the foot
of the hill was an intersecting street. The defendant disregarded the
guest's caution to drive slower. It was held that the operation of
the automobile at the time-of the accident was a heedless and reckless
disregardof the rights of the plaintiff. In Maker v. Faky 37 the plaintiff's decedent was riding as a guest of the defendant Fahy when a
collision occurred with the car driven by the defendant Verwholt. At
the time of the collision the Fahy car was occupying 2/2 feet of the
left side of the street 35 feet wide, leaving nearly three times the width
of the Verwholt car for it to pass. The street in front of the Fahy
car was clear of vehicles; and Fahy was not racing with the Verwholt
car. This was held not to be heedless and reckless disregard of the
rights of the guest.
In Boyle v. Dolan 38 the declaration alleged "that the defendant
invited the plaintiff to drive with him in his automobile; that plantiff
accepted the invitation; that defendant driving said automobile at a
reckless and careless and dangerous rate of speed, over plaintiff's
repeated objections and request to drive at a careful and prudent rate
of speed, negligently and carelessly lost control of said automobile,
and negligently and carelessly collided with another automobile ... "
The Supreme Court of Florida, in a per curiam decision, held that the
declaration did "not wholly fail to state a cause of action," and that
a demurrer thereto had been improperly sustained. There was no discussion of the principles of liability. The result indicates that in this
jurisdiction the driver owes a duty to the guest of using ordinary care
in the operation of the car. The three degrees of negligence seem to
be recognized by the Supreme Court of Florida. 39
The Appellate Courts of Illinois adopt the rule, in regard. to the
liability of an owner or operator of an automobile to an invited guest,
that the operator or owner is bound to exercise reasonable care for the
safety of his invited guest and that whether the invitation is express
85
38
37
88
39

At page 264.
147 AUt. 678 (Conn. 1929).
151 Atl. 318 (Conn. 1930).
120 So. 334 (Fla. 1929).
See Florida Southern Ry. Co. v. Hirst, 11 So. 506 (Fla. 1892).
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or implied. 40 The duty is based upon the fact that the guest "isin
41
a sense in the custody of" the owner of the car.
In Munson v. Rupker 42 the complaint alleged that the plaintiff
had been invited by the defendant to become his guest on an automobile trip; and that while the defendant negligently drove the automobile at a speed of 40 miles an hour he attempted to make a turn
but failed to do so and negligently drove the car into a ravine, causing
it to turn over and injure the plaintiff. The lower court instructed the
jury that if it found from the evidence that the plaintiff was present
in the car at his own solicitation, and not as an invited guest, the
defendant would owe no duty to him except not to injure him-intentionally or willfully. In holding that this instruction constituted error,
the court said:
"It seems to us that the only sensible and humane rule is that an
owner and driver of an automobile owes a guest as sufferance the
duty of using reasonable care so as not to injure him. The rule as
to trespassers and licensees upon real estate, with all its niceties and
distinctions, is not to be applied to one riding in an automobile at the
invitation of, or with the knowledge and tacit consent of, the 6wner
and operator of the automobile. A trespasser and licensee going upon
a tract of land-an inert, immovable body-takes it as he finds it,
with knowledge that the owner cannot and will not by any act of his
start it in motion and hurl it through space in a manner that may
mean death to him who enters thereon. He who enters an automobile
to take a ride with the owner also takes the automobile and the
driver as he finds them. But, when the owner of the automobile
starts it in motion, he, as it were, takes the life of his guest into his
keeping, and in the operation of such cal: he must use reasonable care
not to injure any one riding therein with his knowledge and consent.
It will not do to say that the operator of an automobile owes no more
duty to a person riding with him as a guest at sufferance, or as a selfinvited guest, than a gratuitous bailee owes to a block of wood. The
law exacts of one who puts a force in motion that he shall control it
with skill and care, in proportion to the danger created. This rule
applies to a guest at sufferance as well as to a guest by invitation."
(Italics supplied.)
In its reference to the rule applicable to licensees upon real estate,
the court seems to overlook the principle that the possessor owes
a duty to the licensee, who has availed himself of the permission,
to use reasonable care in conducting his activities on' the premises
40 Lasley v. Crawford, 228 Ill. App. 590 (1923)
Barnett v. Levy, 213 II. App. 129 (1919).

41 See Barnett v. Levy, op. cit. supra note 40.
42 148 N. E. 169 (Ind. App. 1925).

(Implied invitation).
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NOTES
so as not to imperil the safety of the licensee. At least the court
did not go far enough in discussing the duty of the possessor of
premises to a licensee thereon. The basis for the rule adopted is
obvious from the court's reasoning. The duty is owed to the guest as
a human being whose person is in the custody of the driver of the
automobile-a person who has availed himself of the permission to be
in the car to the knowledge of the driver. On petition for rehearing,
which petition was denied, 43 the court expressly repudiated the view
that either the analogy of the real property cases or gratuitous bailment of personal property cases applied to the situation. However,
in 1929 the Legislature of Indiana passed a statute 44 which limited
the liability of the owner or operator of a motor vehicle to one who
is riding in it as his guest to two classes of cases: First, when the
accident is caused by intentional misconduct; and, second, when it is
caused by reckless disregard of the rights of others. This excludes
any liability for failure to use ordinary care. In the Munson case
it was said that there are no degrees of negligence in Indiana. In
Vandalia R. Co. v. Clem 45 the Indiana Appellate Court said:
"To constitute a willful injury, the act which produced it must have
been intentional, or must have been done under such circumstances
as evinced a reckless disregardfor the safety of others, and a willingness to inflict the injury complained of. It involves conduct- which
is quasi criminal." (Italics supplied.)
While this is a definition of willful misconduct, it is a definition in
terms of a reckless disregard for the safety of others. *So it seems that
any liability under the statute must be based on conduct that is quasi
criminal.
In Kentucky, a jurisdiction which recognizes tao degrees of negligence (slight and gross, the latter being defined as a failure to use
slight care), 46 the owner of an automobile owes to an invited guest
the duty to use "ordinary care to avert and not to create or increase
danger." The leading case in this state and a case that is frequently
cited in other jurisdictions is Beard v. Klusmeier.47 In this case the
plaintiff, who was an invited guest in the defendant's automobile, testified that the defendant was racing with another car that had attempted to pass and that she had protested and asked to be allowed
to get out but the defendant had refused to heed her request;
that the defendant's car collided with a pile of brick, sand, and other
building material, which had been stacked in the street, injuring her.
43

151 N. E. 101 (Ind. App. 1926).

44
45

4 BURNS ANN. IND. STATUTES (WATSON'S REV.) Supp., 1929, § 10142.1.
96 N. E. 789, 791 (Ind. App. 1911).
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Dodge, 66 S. W. 606 (Ky. App. 1902); Louis-
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ville & N. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 217 S. W. 686 (Ky. App. 1919).
47 164 S. W. 319 (Ky. App. 1914).
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The case was decided primarily on the authority of Connecticut decision in Pigeon v. Lane.48 In discussing this case,; the court said:
"In that case the person invited to ride in the private vehicle of another is declared to be a licensee, and the duty of the person giving
such invitation is stated to be the refraining from doing any 'negligent
acts by which the danger of riding upon the conveyance was increased or a new danger created.' . . . A person thus invited to ride

stands in the same situation as a bare licensee who enters upon real
property which the licensor is under no obligation to make safe or keep
so, but who is liable only for active negligence . . . We think the

rule there stated is the correct rule, and that appellant's duty to
appellee was to use ordinary care not to increase the danger of her
riding with him, or to cieate any new danger . . . if the driver fails

to use ordinary care in driving the automobile, he thereby creates a
new danger for which he is liable."
The court also cited Mayberry v. Sivey, 49 a case wherein the Kansas
court said:
".. . the law requires from all persons, including those who render
gratuitous services, reasonable care for the safety of life and person."
'So the Kentucky court has thrown but very little light upon the basis
for the rule prevailing in that jurisdiction. It seems as if the court intends to adopt the analogy of the real property cases. In R. B. Tyler
Co. v. Kirby's Adm'r.50 the court said that the Beard case "held that a
social guest in an autofnobile is a licensee," and made the distinction
between licensees and invitees depend on the purpose of the visit,
whether for the sole benefit of the passenger or partly at least for the
benefit of the owner of the car. The distinction seems to be immaterial,
however, in so far as the scope of the duty is concerned."
In Fitzjarrel v. Boyd 51 the plaintiff, while riding as an invited
guest, was injured because of the alleged negligence in the operation
of the automobile. It was alleged that the driver of the car was negligent "in attempting to pass another vehicle upon the road on which
they were traveling at a high rate of speed and against the protest of"
the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it was the
duty of the defendant to use ordinary care not to increase the danger
of the riding with him or to create any new danger, such as by fast
and reckless driving. There was no discussion of the basis for this
rule. The court relied mainly upon the authority of Patnode v. Foote
and Beard v. Klusmeier. This jurisdiction does not seem to recognize
52
any degrees of negligence.
48

49
50

51
52

67 At. 886, 11 Ann. Cas. 371 (Conn. 1907).
18 Kan. 291 (1877).
293 S. W. 155 (Ky. App. 1927).
91 AtI. 547 (Md. App. 1914).
See Schermer v. Neurath, 54 Md. 491, 39 Am. Rep. 397 (1880).
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In Hemington v. Hemington 53 the plaintiff was riding as a guest
of her daughter at the time of the accident. "It appears that the
daughter drove at an unlawful and reckless rafe of speed, against the
repeated remonstrances of her mother, and the immediate occasion of
the accident was putting on the brakes, under a speed of 45 miles per
hour, to avoid a horse and buggy crossingthe road at an intersecting
highway." The Supreme Court of Michigan said that case came within
the rule relative to driver and guest, and that the driver of an automobile is under the obligation of exercising reasonable care for the
safe transportation of his guests and not to unreasonably expose the
guest to danger by increasing the hazard of this method of travel. As
authority for this the court relied on Huddy on Automobiles (5th ed.)
§ 678. There was no discussion of the rule.5 4 The Supreme Court of
Michigan purports to recognize only what it labels "ordinary negligence" and "subsequent negligence." 55 The latter has been frequently
called "gross negligence," and defined as "an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as
affecting the life or property of another." 56 The later cases pointout
that this is a misuse of the expression "gross negligence" and that
such misconduct is not negligence at all. 57
In Missouri it is said that "it is the duty of an automobile owner
and driver .to use reasonable care in its operation, and not to unreasonably expose a guest to injury." As authority' for this the St.
Louis Court of Appeals, in Alley v. Wall, 58 cited Berry on Automobles (2d ed.) and Huddy's Law of Automobiles (2d ed.) but there
was no discussion of the principle involved. In the Alley case the
plaintiff was an invited guest of the defendant (the driver). The alleged negligence consisted in permitting the car to run off the highway,
into a ditch, while the defendant was attempting, to pass a truck. The
court held that there was no error in refusing to give the defendant's
instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence. In the ordinary action based on negligence, the Supreme Court of Missouri does
not recognize the three degrees of negligence.5 9
In Hornbeck v. Richards 60 the Supreme Court of Montana said:
"We are of the opinion that the express or implied duty of the driver
of an automobile to one who rides with him as an invited guest is to
53 190 N. W. 683 (Mich. 1922).
54
Cf. Emery v. Ford, 207 N. W. 856 (Mich.

1926):

Union Trust Co. v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry., 214 N. W. 166 (Mich. 1927).
56 Denman v. Johnston, 48 N. W. 565, 567 (Mich. 1891); Wexcl v. Grand
Rapids & I. Ry. Co., 157 N. W. 15, 17 (Mich. 1916).
57 Gibbard v. Cursan, 196 N. W. 398 (Mich. 1923).
56 272 S. W. 999 [St. Louis Ct. of App. (Mo.) 1925].
50 See Young v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 127 S. W. 19 (Mo. 1910).
60 257 Pac. 1025 (Mont. 1927).
55
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exercise reasonable and ordinary care in its operation so as not unteasonably to expose such guest to danger by increasing the hazard
incident to that method of travel

. . .

'The care must be proportion-

ate to the danger.'"
In this case the plaintiff's intestate was riding as an invited guest of
the defendant's intestate in the latter's automobile. The car "was being driven at a rate of speed approximating 40 miles per hour" at the
time of the accident, but no objection was made by any one in the
car as to the speed or the manner of driving until the instant of the
accident. It does not appear that this court has decided the question
as to whether there are three degrees of negligence recognized in this
jurisdiction in the ordinary action for negligence. 61
It is said that "the most remarkable and striking view on the subject is the one adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey" in tie
cases of Lutvin v. Dopkus 62 and Rose v. Squires 63 "where the court
relied upon an analogy to earlier property cases, holding that a licensee can recover only for injuries sustained by reason of the willful
acts of the landowner, and where the court based the distinction between a licensee and an invitee, not on the ground of the purpose of
the injured person's presence in the automobile, but on the question
as to whether such person was invited to ride or was merely permitted to do so." 64 In the former of these two cases the plaintiffs had
asked the defendant to drive them to a picnic, given by a social organization of which the parties to the controversy were members. The
plaintiffs alleged that on the return trip the car was driven at a high
rate of speed by the defendant and while so driven it overturned, injuring the plaintiffs. It was held that the legal status of the plaintiffs
was that of licensees "to whom the only legal obligation imposed is
that of refraining from the perpetration of acts wantonly or willfully
injurious." In the latter case Lena' Rose, the plaintiff's intestate in one
of the cases involved, and Anna Rose, the plaintiff in the other, were
passengers in an automobile driven by the defendant Campbell "when
it came into collision with another automobile driven by the other defendant Squires, which came out of a side street. As a result of the
collision, Campbell's automobile ran into a tree, Anna Rose was severely, and Lena Rose fatally injured." It was a disputed question of fact
as to whether the "two Rose women were in Campbell's car by his
invitation, or at their own solicitation." The court said:
61 See Neary v.-N. P. Ry. Co., i10 Pac. 226, 231 (Mont. 1910), and cases
cited therein.
62 108 At!. 862 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1920).
63 128 At. 880 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1925).
64 See remarks of the court in Munson v. Rupker, op. cit. supra note 43,
at 102.
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"If the former alternative, he would of course owe them a duty of
reasonable care; in the latter, he owed them no duty except to abstain from acts wilfully injurious . . . there is a substantial distinction between mere negligence, albeit gross, and willful injury. It was
never suggested in the case that Campbell desired or attempted to
hurt his passengers . . .Willful negligence is common enough; it is
often called 'taking a chance.' But unless there be positive intent to
do injury to a licensee or trespasser no legal duty is violated."
If we accept the language used in the quotation from the Rose case
at its face value it appears that the Supreme Court of New Jersey
does not recognize the three degrees of negligence in the ordinary
action based upon negligence.
In Bauer v. Griess 35 the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the
driver of an automobile who invites another to ride with him as his
guest is bound "to use ordinary care not to increase" the danger to
the guest or "to create any new danger, such as by fast and reckless
driving." The court relied upon the Kentucky decision of Beard v.
Klusmeier; and there was no discussion of the principle. 'It appeared,
from the facts, that the plaintiff was invited by the defendant to go
pleasure driving, and that the plaintiff was injured when the defendant
"drove his car too far to the left side of the beaten tread of the road,
thereby striking a small ditch" while he was racing with the driver of
another car that had passed them. The evidence was conflicting as
to whether the plaintiff had urged that the speed of the defendant's
car be increased. It is said that there are no degrees of negligence in
66
this jurisdiction.
In Stewart v. Houk 67 the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the
Oregon "guest" ttatute, which deprived the guest of the right of recovery against the owner or driver of the automobile for an injury
negligently inflicted upon him by his host if he was being transported
without charge, unconstitutional since it deprived the guest of his
common-law remedy for negligence without providing some other efficient remedy in its place; also, because the statute supplied an implied
stipulation for nonliability of the host for negligence regardless of the
incapacity of the guest to contract and regardless of the culpability
of the host. The court said that the host owes a duty to the guest to
exercise due care for his guest's safety. In Cederson v. Oregon R. &
Nay. Co.68 the court said:
"There are degrees of negligence, such as slight and gross ... In some
instances greater care and vigilance is exacted than in others."
65
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181 N. IV. 156 (Neb. 1920).
See remarks of, Ragan, C., in Village of Culbertson v. Holliday, 69 N. W.

853 (Neb. 1897).
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271 Pac. 998 (Or. 1928).
62 Pac. 637 (Or. 1900).
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So this jurisdiction seems to recognize degrees of negligence in' the
ordinary action based on negligence.
The rule in Pennsylvania -seems to be that the host owes to the
guest the duty to use ordinary care in the operation of the automobile. 69 It is not clear as to whether the rule is based on the analogy
of the gratuitous bailment cases or upon the fact that the host has
given his consent to the presence of the guest in the car and must
take this into account in the operation of the car. The court does say
that "whether there are three or more or less kinds or degrees of
negligence, however, and whether there is 'a distinction between
'kinds' and 'degrees' is beside the question." 70
The attitude of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in reference to
the doctrine is set forth in Leonard v. Bartle.71 In this case the plaintiff charged the defendant "with recklessly operating and driving his
automobile on a public highway at an excessive and improper speed,
thereby causing personal injury to the plaintiff, a guest and free
passenger in defendant's car." It appeared that the plaintiff was a
member of a party of five persons who were returning home in the
defendant's automobile (a coupe) from a dance. The plaintiff became
a passenger in the car at the suggestion of one of the defendant's
friends and passengers. There was evidence showing that the defendant drove at a speed of 40 miles an hour over a road that was
unlighted and rough from lack of repair, and that he had increased
the speed of the car over the protests of the plaintiff and another
one of the passengers. The defendant lost control of the car, which
left the highway and ran against a tree. The only question was whether
the trial court erred in refusing to charge, in accordance with the request of the defendant, that if the jury found that the plaintiff was a,
guest of the defendant and not a passenger for hire, she could recover damages only if the jury found that the defendant was guilty
of gross negligence in the operation of his car. In overruling the defendant's exception, and holding that the request to so charge was
properly denied, Stearns, J., said:
"In this state the doctrine of degrees of negligence has never been
adopted. In the case of bailment of goods, the amount of care required
in different kinds of bailment in some jurisdictions is made the basis
for the establishment of degrees of negligence generally. But in this
state the obligation of the bailee has been considered with reference
to the duty rather than to the characterization of the breach of the
69 See Cody v. Venzie, op. cit. supra note 31; Simpson v. Jones, 131 At.
541 (Pa. 1925); Conroy v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 140 Ati. 905 (Pa. 1928);
Ferrell v. Solski, 123 Atl. 493 (Pa. 1924).
70 Remarks of Simpson, J., in Cody v. Venzie, op. cit. supra note 31, at 384.
71 135 At. 853 (R. I. 1927).
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duty as slight, ordinary, or gross negligence . . . 'Ordinary care is
such care as a person of ordinary prudence exercises under the circumstances of the danger to be apprehended. The greater the danger
the higher the degree of care required to constitute ordinary care, the
absence of which is negligence. It is a question of degree only. The
kind of care is precisely the same. . . . The duty of the driver in the
operation of an automobile in this state is regulated by statute (which
provides a maximum rate of speed, and a penalty for violation) ...
The prohibition of reckless driving is to prevent injury to 'any person.' The statute requires the same duty of care of a guest or passenger in the operation of the car and the rate of speed as of a person
outside the automobile; the fact that the conveyance, as in this case,
was free, does not lessen the duty of the exercise of ordinary care by
the operator. . . . if the rate of speed is in excess of the maximum
statutory limit, such fast driving is evidence of negligence."
Of course it is much easier to reach a solution of the problem as to
the scope of the duty and the basis for it in jurisdictions which do
not recognize the three degrees of negligence. The Rhode'Island
court reached its conclusion;, in part at least, by a process of elimination. If the liability is based on the statute, the decision would not
provide a general rule .applicable to all situations.
In Robinson v. Leonard 72 the plaintiff was a self-invited guest in
the defendant's automobile. "The negligence charged in the declaration is traveling at a high rate of speed and swerving out of the road,
by reason of which the defendant lost control of the car." The trial
court: permitted the plaintiff to testify, over an objection that the evidence was incompetent, irrevelant, and immaterial, to a conversation
with the defendant, that took place soon after the accident, in which
the defendant said that he lost control of the car because he was going too fast. The Supreme Court of Vermont held that there was no
error in receiving the evidence over this objection. The defendant
moved for a directed verdict, at the close of the evidence, on four
grounds, one of which was that if the plaintiff was a self-invited guest
there could be no recovery without showing a willful or wanton injury. The defendant contended that if the plaintiff was a self-invited
kuest his status was that of a licensee. It was held that such was not
the rule in Vermont; and that the same obligation, i. e., to use ordinary care in the operation of the car, is imposed upon the driver in
the case of a self-invited guest as in case of one expressly invited by
the driver. The decision seems to have been based upon the fact that
the plaintiff had availed himself of the defendant's permission to be in
the car. In McAndrews v. Leonard,7 3 another case growing out of the
72
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134 At. 706 (Vt. 1926).
134 At. 710 (Vt. 1926).
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same accident as that involved in the Robinson case, the court said:
".. . the term 'gross negligence' forms no separate division of negligence under our law, outside of bailments, as to which we say nothing.
See Briggs v. Taylor, 28 Vt. 180."
In Moorefield v. Lewis 74 the plaintiff's decedent was a guest of the
defendant on a pleasure drive in the latter's automobile. The road terninated abruptly at a river bank; a proposed bridge, "to carry the
road across the river at this point, had not been constructed." No barriers or signs stood to warn travelers on the way. The situation of
danger could have been observed by those using the highway for a
distance of 250 or 300 feet. The defendant admitted that he "was
traveling 20 miles an hour towards the end of a 'blind' road, leading
up a mountain gorge, with numerous curves and steep embankments.
Some of the evidence shows the speed to have been 30 miles an houir.."
The defendant was unable to stop his car in time to avoid being precipitated into the river. The plaintiff recovered a judgment, to which
the defendant prosecuted a writ of error assigning as one ground that
counsel for the plaintiff, in the course of an opening statement to the
jury, had said that the defendant had indemnity insurance. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia said:
.. . we would be inclined to reverse the case on this ground (viz.,
that this statement was highly prejudicial to the defendant, and his
motion to discharge the jury on this ground should have been sustained) but for the fact that, in our opinion, a plain case for recovery has been established . . . . 'The express or implied duty of the
owner and driver to the occupant of the car is to exercise reasonable
care in its operation, and not to unreasonably expose him to danger
by increasing the hazard of that method of travel.' 75 . . . The defendant, no doubt absorbed in the pleasure of the occasion, was without conscious sense of the danger. This, however, does not relieve him
of legal negligence. A person in charge of an instrumentality as productive of injury as an automobile in motion should direct his attention to its proper and careful operation."
In Marple v. Haddad76 the plaintiff's decedent was riding with the
defendant as a self-invited guest on the latter's truck when the truck
suddenly left the road and ran down an embankment and injuring the
plaintiff's decedent so that he died as a result. There were two theories as to what caused the accident. The plaintiff contended that the
defendant lost control of the truck, while rounding a curve, because
he was driving at a reckless rate of speed. The defendant contended
that the accident resulted from a defect in the steering apparatus of
74
75

76

S. E. 564 (W. Va. 1924).
Citing HuDDY oN AUTOMOBILES (6th ed.) 880.
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the truck. Two mechanics examined the truck after the accident and
found that the steering apparatus was defective. On the other hand,
five eyewitnesses fixed the speed of the truck at the time of the accident as from 22 to 40 miles an hour. In the second instruction to the
jury the trial court said that it was the duty of the defendant to use
ordinary care in the operation of the truck. The defendant contended
that this instruction was erroneous because the only duty of the defendant was to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring the deceased. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia referred to
its former decision in the Moorefield case as committing it "to the
doctrine of ordinary or' reasonable care," and that this is the rule
whether the passenger is a self-invited guest or one expressly invited
by the owner of the car. The court admitted that the rule seems to be
"'incongruous with the innate and natural spirit of gratitude with
which such hospitality should be met';" but it said that "'one who
takes another into one of these high-powered swiftly moving machines knows disaster may follow, unless he operates it with the required degree of care. He must know and realize that he has voluntarily taken the life and safety of a human being into his care."
(Italics supplied.) In Poling v. Ohio River R. Co.7 7 it was said
that the terms "slightest negligence" and "gross negligence" were applicable in this jurisdiction, especially in two classes of cases; "The
former, to common carriers of passengers .. . The latter, to voluntary
licensees and trespassers." But this jurisdiction has not applied the
analogy of the real property cases to the .driver and guest cases; so
'the three degrees of negligence seem 'to be of no importance in connection with the question under discussion, especihlly in view of the
decision in the Marple case.
In Mitchell v. Raymond 78 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that the driver of an automobile owes to his invited guest the duty
of using ordinary care in the operation and management of the car
to prevent injury to the guest. The court reasoned as follows:
"We therefore now hold, in accord with what seems the great weight
of authority and as a choice among many rules, each of which bristles
with difficulties; that, as to the gratuitous guest in a vehicle on a
public highway, the owner or driver of such vehicle owes to such guest
the duty of exercising ordinary care to avoid personal injury to him
...Under this rule as now determined the host who assumes to pilot
his vehicle upon the public highways, subject as all such vehicles are
to the rules and regulations governing traffic on crowded present day
thoroughfares becomes chargeable, in such operation and management
of his vehicle, with the duty of exercising ordinary care to avoid in77
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jury to his occupant. This conclusion we are forced to reach, even
though the rule as thus declared may seem incongruous with the innate and natural spirit of gratitude with which such hospitality should
be met."
The court went on to say:
"We must also decline to recognize any such possible distinction as
is spoken of in several decisions between the guest who asks for the
favor and the guest who is first invited by the host."
In referring to the Connecticut decision of Deckerson v. Conn. Co.7 9
the court said:
"Though the Connecticut court declines to recognize the distinction so
firmly established in this jurisdiction between the three degrees of negligence-slight, ordinary, and gross-yet such different view on that
particular question does not affect the question here, as the expressions used inthat case as to ordinary care coincides with our definition
of the same term when used in this jurisdiction."
In the Mitchell case the plaintiff Jane M. Mitchell in an automobile, driven by the defendant Morey, was riding "southwesterly on
county highway A." This highway joins with, but does not cross, state
trunk highway 63. The defendant Raymond was driving his automobile north on highway 63. "A collision occurred on highway 63 and
about opposite the end of county highway A, and as a result Mrs.
Mitchell was injured." According to the evidence of the defendant
Raymond, a high embankment shut off the view from either highway
of approaching vehicles from the other until they were within a very
short distance apart. The speed of either car does not appear from
the reported facts, but the court said that the facts warranted the
conclusions reached by the jury and trial court that the driver of each
automobile was driving at an excessive and unreasonable rate of speed.
As to whether there was gross negligence on the part of defendant
Morey is another matter. According to the law of Wisconsin the defendant Morey had the "right of way" over defendant Raymond, who
was approaching from the left.8 0 Notwithstanfling the statutory provisions, does not the public interest demand that the operator of a
vehicle on one of the main arteries of traffic have the right of way,
especially under the circumstances existing in the principle case? Do
not traffic conditions today demand high speed on the main state
highways? Some state legislatures have already repealed statutes that
limited the speed of motor vehicles on state highways to a certain
number of miles an hour. It does riot appear in the principal case as
to whether either defendant violated a "stop" or a "slow" notice. It
would probably be desirable today to require operators of vehicles
79

80

118 AtI. 518 (Conn. 1922).
See Bertschy v. Seng, 195 N. W. 854 (Wis. 1923).

NOTES

about to enter the main arteries of traffic to stop, look, and listen.'
The collision took place in August, i. e., during the heavy traffic season. Of course, according to this decision, it is not necessary to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the defendant Morey was guilty of
gross negligence. But this jurisdiction purports to recognize the three
degrees of negligence., Yet 'this decision states that the definition of
ordinary care in Wisconsin coincides with that accepted by the Connecticut court-a jurisdiction that purports to apply but one degree of
negligence.
In Vogel v. Otto,8 1 a decision of the same date as that in the

Mitchell case, the Wisconsin court applied the same doctrine. In this
case the plaintiff was a "gratuitous guest" of the defendant Otto, the
owner and driver of the car. She was injured ,byreason of the "bumping of the machine" over the rails at a railroad crossing. In endeavoring to cross the railroad at an angle the right wheels of the car failed
to reach the planking that was provided and this caused the bumping
of the car with such violence as to injure the plaintiff. The lights of
the car were "shed in a direction so as not to disclose the exposed
rails;" and the defendant did not decrease the speed of his automobile
when he crossed the rails. The court held that "in view of the rule
of ordinary care now adopted by this court, that the question of the
defendant Otto's negligence raised a proper question for the jury," and
that the lower court erred in granting a nonsuit as to him. The situation seems to be regarded in the same manner as that of driving at
an excessive and unreasonable speed. In the Mitchell case the Wisconsin court specifically stated that they did not intend to "limit or
withdraw" anything that had previously been said as to liability for
an injury due to the defective "condition" of the automobile. In O'Shea
v. Lavoy s -' a case that was decided two years before the Mitchell and
Vogel cases, it was held that the owner of an automobile is not liable
to an invited guest riding therein for injuries sustained by the ,latter,
due to the turning over of the car because of the defective condition of
the car. The theory of the decision was that the rules of liability that
apply to a licensee goifig upon the premises of the licensor apply with
reference to the condition of the automobile. Beginning in 1926 we
have what has been called "a series of recessions from Mitchell v.
Raymond," 83 starting with Cleary v. Eckart.8 4 In that case it was
held that the invited guest accepts such skill as may be possessed by
the driver in the operation of the car. The court said:
plaintiff accepted such hospitality as the host had to offer, and
81
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that consisted of the car in the condition in which it was, and the
driver, with such limited skill as she had been able to acquire in driving a car but 1,200 miles, of which the plairitiff had knowledge."
In expanding this doctrine to what was conceived to be its logical limits,
the Wisconsin court, in Olson v. Hermansen,85 said that it included
whatever risks attached to the driver's customary habits of driving.
The invited guest',also assumes the risk incident to the driver's known
lack of sleep. 86 Also, the risks incident to the peculiar nature of the
trip, such as driving to a fire, are said to be assumed by the guest.8 7
Failure to establish a breach of duty to use ordinary care is one
thing. It is quite another to show assumption of risk or contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery when once a breach of duty to use
ordinary care is established. In the Krueger case, however, the court
held, as a matter of law, that there was a "failure to show any actionable negligence by defendant." So it seems that in the latter class of
cases, involving assumption of risk, recovery must be based upon gross
negligence or willful wrongdoing. Suppose a case should arise wherein the guest Was not familiar with the driver or his habits of driving.
Would the rule announced in the Mitchell and Vogel cases apply? It
is difficult to predict what attitude the Wisconsin court would take. It
has adopted a most flexible definition of ordinary care:
"Ordinary care is a relative term, it depends in no small degree upon
the given situation. Where the danger resulting from inadvertence is
great, the care known as ordinary care calls for a greater degree of
care than where the danger resulting from inadvertence is slight." 88
Gross negligence is defined as an act "which is intentional or done under
such circumstances as to make the willful, wanton disregard of the
rights of others equivalent to an intent." 89
Gross negligence as thus defined is different in kind from gross negligence which is a failure to use slight care. Yet, in the Mitchell case,
the Wisconsin court says that the distinction between the three degrees
of negligence is "firmly established in this jurisdiction." So the term
"gross negligence" is used to signify two different things. In the one
sense ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention, while
in the other sense gross negligence differs in kind from ordinary negligence. Probably the court will abandon the use of this term in the
former sense. 90
220 N. W. 203, 61 A. L. R. 1243 (Wis. 1928).
86 Krueger v. Krueger, 222 N. W. 784 (Wis. 1929).
87 Sommerfield v. Flury, 223 N. W. 408 (Wis. 1929).
88 Per Owen, J., in Sommerfield v. Flury, op. cit. supra note 87, at 411.
80 Per Rosenbury, J., in Theby v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 222 N. W. 826,
85

831 (Wis. 1929).
90 See Theby v. Wis. Power & Light Co.,

op. cit.

supra note 89.
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The Supreme Court of Wyoming adopts the rule that the owner or
operator of an automobile is under a duty to his invited guest to use
ordinary care in the operation of the car,91 relying on the Alabama de•cision of Perkins v. Galloway.9 2 It does not appear from the decisions
in this jurisdiction as to whether the three degrees of negligence are
recognized.
In some states the host is liable to the guest only where gross
negligence is found. The Court of Appeals of Georgia adopts this socalled minority rule. In Epps v. Parrish9 it was alleged that the
plaintiff was riding as a guest in an automobile owned and driven by
the defendant, and that the latter "carelessly and negligently, and because of inexperience and lack of skill in the handling of an automobile, lost control of the automobile and drove it, head on, into a tree,"
by reason of which the plaintiff was injured. It was held that no
cause of action was set forth, as it was not alleged that the defendant
was guilty of gross negligence. This appears to be the first decision on
the question of the nature of the liability in this clas of cases in
Georgia. The court, in discussing the question of liability, said:
"See, in this connection, the reasoning set out in Selo v. Dunn & Brown,
42 Ga. 528, 5 Am. Rep. 544..."
In the Selo case it was held that one who keeps a ferry for one's own
use and for the convenience of the customers at one's mill, but who
does not charge ferriage, is not a common carrier, and is only liable
for gross negligence. The court reasoned that the ferryman was a
mandatory, a bailee not for hire, and so was only liable for gross negligence.
In Harris v. Reed .14 the plaintiff sued for damages alleged to have
been sustained while she was riding in an automobile as "a gratuitous
invited guest of the defendant." "The petition charges that the defendant, while driving her automobile upon the public highway at a
rate of speed of 'about 35 miles an hour,' overtook and passed another automobile on the right-hand side, and in doing so scraped the
fenders of the other car and that 'just after' this, and while driving
at the rate of approximately 40 miles an hour, defendant turned her
head to look back, and caused her automobile to run off an embankment, thereby inflicting described injuries upon the plaintiff .
" The
plaintiff was the only witness at the trial. It appeared that after the
striking of the other car the plaintiff admonished the defendant to
"look out;" and that immediately thereafter the defendant had glanced
91 Ryan v. Snyder, 211 Pac. 482 (Wyo. 1923); Collins v. Anderson, 260
Pac. 1089 (Wyo. 1927).
92 Op. cit. supra note 13.
93 106 S. E. 297 (Ga. App. 1921).
94
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backwards. But it did not appear as to whether the defendant had
looked back because of the striking of the other car or because of the
plaintiff's admonition. The Court of Appeals of Georgia held that the
defendant was not guilty of gross negligence, saying:
"The speed at which she (the defendant) was driving, and the fact
that in some wholly unexplained manner she scraped the fender of the
other car, could not possibly be held to prove that the defendant was
operating the car without the existence of even a 'slight' degree of
care. Nor can it be said that the fact that the defendant, in the emergency and under the sudden excitement attendant upon scraping the
other car, and the admonition which was then uttered by the plaintiff,
obeyed the promptings of a natural and humane. instinct by momentarily glancing back at the other car and its occupants, evidences an
entire lack of even slight prudence such as would constitute gross
negligence."
Peavey v. Peavey 95 raises a very interesting question in this connection. The plaintiff was injured in a collision between two automobiles at the intersection of two avenues in the city of Atlanta, while
riding as a guest in one of the cars. The gross negligence charged was
violation of the state statute prohibiting the driving of automobiles at
a greater rate of speed than 10 miles an hour while approaching and
traversing intersections of public highways. The Court of Appeals of
Georgia said that conceding that this statute applies to intersections of
streets in a city, the violation of this law would not constitute gross
negligence. But suppose the collision had taken place at a time when
or place where traffic was heavy. Or suppose the car, in which the
plaintiff was riding, was being driven at a speed of 30 or 40 miles an
hour. Certainly, merely driving faster than 10 miles an hour is not
necessarily gross negligence at common law.
Massachusetts has adopted the rule that the measure of liability
of the automobile driver or owner who undertakes to carry gratis is
the same as that of one who undertakes to keep personal property
gratis. The leading case on this theory of liability is Massaletti v.
Fitzroy.9 6 The plaintiff was injured while riding with the defendant
in the latter's automobile and at the defendant's invitation. The car
was driven by the defendant's servant who was furnished by the
owner of the garage where the car was kept. Through the negligence
of the servant the car was overturned and it fell upon the plaintiff
causing the injuries complained of. It was held that the plaintiff could
not recover since gross negligence was not established. The court discusses at considerable length the matter of degrees of negligence and
holds that there is a practical distinction between gross negligence and
95
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the want of ordinary care. While the court reaches this conclusion, it
iecognizes that there is "inherent difficulty" in stating the difference
between these two degrees of negligence. Be that as it may, this court
has rigidly adhiered to the distinction between. these two degrees by
exercising a close supervision over the verdicts of juries in this class
of cases. In so far as it has had the opportunity to do so--that is,
from the factual standpoint-this court has held in approximately
88% of the cases that have come before it that the evidence would or
did not support a finding of gross negligence.
Let us notice the factual situations that have been presented to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In the first place, gross
negligence was defined by Chief Justice Rugg in Altman v. Aronson,97
to be the "heedless and palpable violation of a legal duty respecting
the rights of others." In applying this definition, it was held in
Burke v. Cook 98 that a speed of 35 miles an hour upon a roadway
substantially free from traffic, without intersecting streets and without obstruction of vision, the passing of another vehicle, the- act of
turning the wheel quickly to the left since the car seemed to be steering to the right, and the turning over of the car, whether considered
separately or in conjunction, do not tend to prove gross negligence.
The plaintiff was a guest in the car which was owned and operated by
the defendant; and there was a verdict for the plaintiff. The court
remarked that if the action could be maintained by making out a case
of ordinary negligence, there was a jury issue. The decision in this
case was said to govern in Shrier v. Feigelson 9 9 where it was held that
a speed of between 15 and 20 miles an hour on a pavement 21 feet
wide, when no other vehicles were in sight, and the headlights were
"casting a good light before them," a sudden call of warning by the
defendant (the car was owned by the defendant and another, who
were partners in a certain business) to the driver, the turning of the
car to the right and the crashing into a telephone pole, did not confstitute gross negligence. The plaintiff was a guest in the car, which
was operated by a Mr. Germain, another member of the party. There
was a verdict for the plaintiff.
The decision in the Burke case was said to govern in Marcinowski
v. Sanders 100 where it was held that a speed of between 35 and 40
miles an hour on an incline in a country town, while the parties were
traveling towards a fire and there was no other traffic on the highway,
the swaying of the car to the left, and the striking of a telephone pole,
did not constitute gross negligence. The plaintiff was an invited guest
121 N. E. 505, 506 (Mass. 1919)..
141 N. E. 585 (Mass. 1923).
99 153 N. E. 307 (Mass. 307).
100 147 N. E. 275 (Mass. 929).
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of one Richard Hibbard, who was driving at the time of the injury
to the plaintiff; Hibbard died after suit was brought against him and
the action was continued against his administratrix. There was a verdict for the plaintiff.
In Bertelli v. Tronconi 101 the plaintiff was injured in a collision
between the defendant's automobile and a truck, while she was riding
as a guest of the defendant. The plaintiff's testimony described the
speed of the car as "very fast"; and she also testified that it was dark
and raining hard at the time of the accident and that the windshield
was not equipped with a cleaner. A verdict was directed in favor of
the defendant at the trial. It was held that the evidence would not
warrant a finding of gross negligence.
In Forman v. Prevoir102 the plaintiff, while boarding a motor truck
as a self-invited guest, standing with one foot on the truck and about
to grab hold of a rod that held the curtain, was thrown to the ground
and injured when the defendant driver, without ascertaining whether
the plaintiff was in a position of comparative safety, suddenly started
the truck. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. It was
held that the facts did not constitute gross negligence; but the court
said that they might have justified a finding of lack of ordinary care.
In Bank v. Satran 103 the plaintiff was a guest in the car of the
defendant, and was injured in a collision between the defendant's vehicle and a motor bus, while the defendant was rounding a curve at
a speed of 20 miles an hour, on a highway covered with snow. The defendant's automobile skidded into the motor bus. The plaintiff and
another passenger had previously warned the defendant to drive
slower. He had thereupon driven slower for a time and then increased the speed. There was a verdict for the defendant .at the trial.
It was held that the evidence would not support a finding of gross
negligence; but the court observed that it was "abundant to justify
a finding that the defendant drove carelessly."
In Mason v. Thomas 104 the plaintiff was the defendant's guest in
her automobile, and the two rode on the rear seat of the car. The
plaintiff was injured when the car overturned while being driven by
an unlicensed operator. The evidence indicated that the driver, because of want of experience, became confused and excited when a
((car came from behind at a very rapid rate" of speed, and while
seeking to put on the brakes, in his confusion, stepped on the accelerator, and, before the licensed operator beside him could render
101
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assistance, the car went to the right and turned over. There was a
verdict for the plaintiff at the trial. It was held that 'there was no
gross negligence.
In one case, viz., Manning v. Simpson,10 5 the verdict for the plain-.
tiff was allowed to stand. The defendant, in meeting an oncoming car
at a curve on a slippery road and, fearing a collision, put on additional
speed and drove to the left across the path of the approaching car,
in a futile effort to get into a driveway. The court said that "there
was evidence from which the jury could have found that the accident
would have been avoided had he stopped when an ordinary prudent
man would have appreciated danger, or had he turned to his right
and kept on across a graveled bordef and upon some car tracks which,
though uninviting, were less dangerous than the road in front of the
other vehicle. . . The evidence does not require a finding that the
defendant's action was simply unwise conduct of one who, in an
emergency, does what occurs to him on the spur of the moment?' It
was held that "the jury were .warranted in finding" that the defendant
was guilty of conduct amounting to gross negligence.
In six of these Massachusetts decisions, where the jury had an
opportunity to decide that the conduct of the host amounted to gross
negligence, a verdict for the plaintiff was the result. In two of these
eight cases there was a directed verdict. This certainly shows the truth
of the proposition that a mere statement as to what the law is receives but little heed from one who does not understand why he should
not give effect to his natural sympathy for those in distress. On the
other hand, these decisions show that the Massachusetts court is making a determined effort to enforce the rule of liability in that jurisdiction. Probably the only generalization that we can make from these
decisions is that the host's conduct must be such as to show a striking
disregard of the danger of probable injury to his guest in order to be
considered guilty of gross negligence. The nearest that we can come
to predictability of liability based on negligence is that the host's
conduct must strike one at first blush as constituting a palpable disregard of the risk of harm to the guest.
Apparently the first decision on the question under consideration
in Washington is Heiman v. Kloizner. 06 The plaintiff was injured in
a collision betweeen the automobile in which she was riding as an
invited guest of the defendant and another automobile. The collision
took place at an intersection of two streets in the city of Seattle. The
testimony offered by the plaintiff was not very positive as to the
speed at which the defendant's car was being driven at the time of
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the accident, and the court said that it did not show excessive speed.
Also, the court said that other evidence suggested negligence on the
part of the driver of the other car. The court held that the evidence
did not show that the defendant was negligent in that degree necessary
"to render him liable in damages: to the plaintiff, in view of her being
in his automobile as his invited guest." The opinion "does not definitely fix the degree of lack of care which must be shown b an invited guest before liability will result. It holds that degree is somewhere between that required where the carriage is one for hire and
that necessary to be exercised with reference to the safety of a mere
trespasser." 1107 Reasoning from this, the court in Saxe v. Terry 108
said that "it must follow that before an invited guest can recover, a
showing of gross negligence is necessary." The reason for the rule in
this jurisdiction seems to be in the analogy of the gratuitous bailee
cases. The important thing is not that the host has given his consent
to the presence of the guest and must take this into account in the
operation of the car. The scope of the duty depends on the material
benefit that the host derives. In the Saxe case the host's automobile
failed to make a turn because of gravel on the pavement. There was
no evidence of excessive speed. The road was. wet but not "skiddy,"
the accident happened a short time before daylight. The court held
that there was no evidence of gross negligence. There was a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff in the lower court. In the Heiman case the trial
court sitting without a jury gave judgment for the plaintiff. In a concurring opinion Bridges, J., made the following remarks:
"... it does not seem to me either necessary or desirable to inject into
the law an additional degree of care or negligence. Up to the present,
in all personal injury cases other than where common carriers are
involved, I believe the rule of this court has been the doctrine of ordinary care, or such care as a reasonably prudent person would exercise
. . . Slight care might be ordinary care ... The degree of care should
remain the same, but the amount of care required to make up that
degree is different under different circumstances."
Fullerton, J., in a dissenting opinion, said:
"In my opinion the degree of negligence . . . was a question of fact
for the jury and not a question of law for the court."
In Blood v. Austin 109 an action was brought against the driver
of an automobile for causing the death of an invited guest. While
being driven at a speed of from 30 to 40 miles an hour, on a highway
that was "frozen and covered with loose, round gravel or rocks," the
car left the road and ran against a railing on the left which gave way,
107
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causing the car to "topple down an embankment," resulting in the
death of the invited guest. The driver had been warned to slow down
but did not do so in time to round the curve in safety. Also, the driver
started to speed up "about 100 to 200" feet from a caution sign
"Curve 250 feet." At the trial a verdict was directed for the defendant. The Supreme Court of Washington said that
".. . it cannot be held that the injury was wanton, or the result of
gross negligence on the part of the respondent."
This review of the leading cases in the various jurisdictions in this
country which have passed upon the question of the scope of liability,
of the owner or driver of an automobile to his guest, for an injury
due to the negligent operation of the car or for an injury due to the
defective condition of the car while the guest is receiving his gratuitous
transportation exhibits the increasing importance of this problem.
Most of the cases have involved the question of liability due to the
negligent operation of the car. The attempt to solve the problem by
reasoning from the analogies of the landlord and licensee cases or the
gratuitous bailment of personal property cases seems to be undesirable. The duty, it is submitted, should be owing to the guest as a
person who is present in the car with the consent of the owner or
driver, whether as a self-invited guest or as an invited guest, and
whose presence should be taken into account in the matter of the
operation of the automobile. The standard of conduct, whether the
particular jurisdiction recognizes three degrees of negligence, should be
that of a reasonable man. If this rule seems to be incongruous with
the innate and natural spirit of gratitude with which such hospitality
should be met, the answer is that the driver has voluntarily taken the
life and safety of a human being into his care and that an automobile
becomes a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of one who operates
it in a manner contrary to that standard of conduct to which a reasonable man would conform. If this rule operates to the unfair advantage
of the insurance (liability) companies, the remedy lies with them in
the absence of state control over rates.
W. D. Rollison,
assisted by
E. L. Hessmer.

VALIDITY OF LIMITATION OF IIABILITY FOR UNREPEATED OR UNINSURED MEssAEs.-Salesman X goes to a telegraph office in the city

of X for the purpose of sending a telegram to his broker in the city
of Y. He casually turns the blank and reads the following:
"To guard against mistakes or delays the sender of the message
should write it legibly ,and order it repeated, that is, telegraph back
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to the sending station for comparison for such repeating an additional
charge of one-quarter the regular rate will be made. It is agreed between the sender of the message hereof and this company that said
company shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission
or for non-delivery or misdelivery or any unrepeated message beyond
that amount of charge which may or shall accrue to this company, out
of the amount received from the sender for this and the other companies by whose lines such message may pass to reach its destination. That this company shall not be liable for mistakes in the
transmission or delivery or non-delivery or misdelivery of any repeated
message beyond fifty times the extra sum received by this company
by the sender for repeating such message over its own lines."
Two questions arise, first, are those stipulations valid and binding
upon salesman X? Second, are those stipulations binding on him if
he fails to read them? The majority view would answer both questions
in the negative. The minority view would answer both questions in
the affirmative.
The authorities are in conflict as to the validity of this stipulation,
some holding that it is reasonable, and that when assented to by the
sender, it relieves the company from liability beyond the amount stipulated; I while others, and an undoubted numerical majority, are to
the effect that as applied to a case in which the telegraph company
through its servants has been guilty of even ordinary negligence the
2
stipulation is contrary to public policy and void.
All the authorities are in accord that stipulations limiting their
liabilities in case of wilful misconduct or gross negligence are void. 3
Some of the states that hold limitation of liability by contract for
unrepeated message is valid are: California, Massachusetts, Michigan,
1
2
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TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONES,

26 R. C. L., p. 570.

37 Cyc, p. 1684; 11 L. R. A. (N. S.), p. 560,

35 A. L. R. 338, 1907.
3 Dixon v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 3 App. Div. 60, 38 N. Y. Supp.
1056 (1896), where through gross negligence of the defendant's servants, the
word "fifty" was omitted. Held: A stipulation as to unrepeated message was
no defense.
The same rule was applied in: Mowry v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
51 Hun. 62, 126 N. Y. Supp. 666 (1900) (retaining the message for seven days);
Redington v. Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co., 107 Cal. 317, 48 Am. St. Rep. 132,
40 Pac. 432 (1895) (nineteen transmitted as nine).
See: Western U. Tel. Co. v. Piper, Tex. Civ. App. 191 S. W. 817 (1916);
Klotz v. W. U. Tel. Co., 187 Ia. 1355 (1920).
Under an act of Congress, June 18, 1910, U. S. CoNa'. ST. 8563, the sender
of the telegram is bound by the conditions and limitations in the telegram as
to the amount of liability in case of failure to exercise reasonable care in delivery
of telegram. U. S. Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, 175 N. W. 825 (1920); Western U.
Tel. Co. v. Crall, 38 Kan. 679 (1888).
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New York, Pennsylvania, United States Federal Courts, Texas, and
Iowa.4 England and Canada have the same rule.
Some of the states which hold that limitation of liability by contract for negligence of a telegraph company is invalid are: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
and Wisconsin. 5
The purpose of this note is to urge the soundness and reasonableness of the minority view.
One of the main theories on which the majority view is based is
that telegraph companies are quasi-public. They receive from the
public valuable franchises. They owe the public the duty of exercising
care and diligence. Their business intimately concerns the public. Many
interests are practically dependent upon it. Their negligence in the
transmission of a message may often work irreparable mischief to
individuals and communities. It is essential for the public good that
4 Coit v. Western U. Tel. Co., 130 Cal. 657, 53 L. R. A. 678, 80 Am. St.
Rep. 153 (1900). (On account of atmospheric disturbances $35 changed to $27) ;
Grennell v. Western U. Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299, 18 Am. Rep. 485 (1873)
(Omission of the word answer); Western U. Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525
(1867) (Where message on reaching its destination read four cases instead of
forty). Bennett v. Western U. Tel. Co., 18 N. Y. Sup. 772 (1892) (Adding the
letter "s" to "horse"); Passmore v. Western Union Tel. Co., 78 Pa. 238 (1875)
(Where the word "sold" was substituted for "hold"); Primrose v. Western U.
Tel. Co., 154 U. S. 1, 1893; 38 Law. Ed. 883 (1893) (Only mistake of consequence
was the change of the word "bay" to "buy").
5 American Union Tel. Co. v. Daughtery, 81 Ala. 191, 7 So. 660 (1890);
Stiles v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ariz. 308, 15 Pac. 712 (1887); Western
Union v. Short, 53 Ark. 434, 14 S. W. 649, 9 L. R. A. 744 (1890); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Graham, 1 Colo. 230, 9 Am. Rep. 136 (1864); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Miltbn, 53 Fla. 484, 43 So. 495, 125 Am. St. Rep. 1077, 11 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 560 (1907); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Blanciard, 68 Ga. 299, 45 Am.
Rep. 480 (1882); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tyler, 74 Ill. 168, 24 Am. Rep.
279 (1874) ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Meredith, 95 Ind. 93 (1883) ; Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Crall, 38 Kan. 679, 17 Pac. 309, 5 Am. St. Rep. 795 (1888); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Eubanko, 100 Ky. 591, 3 S. W. 1068, 66 Am. St. Rep. 361, 36
L. R. A. 711 (1897); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Goodbar, 82 Miss. 733, 35 So.
190 (1903); Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W. 904, 58
Am. St. Rep. 609, 34 L. R. A. 492 (1896); Kemp v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
28 Neb. 661, 44 N. W. 1064, 26 Am. St. Rep. 363 (1890); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Longwell, 5 N. Mex. 308, 21 Pac. 339 (1889); Williamson et. al. v. Postal
Telegraph Co., 151 N. C. 223, 65 S. E. 974 (1909); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Driswold, 39 Ohio 301, 41 Am. Rep. 500 (1881); Blackwell Milling v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 19 Okla. 376, 89 Pac. 235 (1906); Pepper et al. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 87 Tenn. 554 (1889); Wertz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 7 Utah
446 (1891); Gillis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 61 Vt. 461, 17 Atl. 736 (1889);
Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399 (1909).
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their duty of using care and diligence be rigidly enforced. 6 They
should no more be allowed to effectually stipulate for exemption from
this duty than should a common carrier of passengers or any other
party engaged in a public business.
The majority view insists that this rule does not make telegraph
companies insurers. It does not make them answer for errors not
resulting from their negligence. It only reqiuires the performance of
their plain duty. It is no hardship upon them. They engage into
business voluntarily. They have the entire control of their servants
and instruments. They invite the public to entrust messages to them
for transmission. 7 Why then should they refuse to perform the common duty of care?
A common carrier is not allowed to protect himself by contract
without consideration from liability for result of his own negligence. 8
There seems to be no good reason why the same rule should not apply
to a telegraph company.
The minority rule answers the above argument by saying that the
liability of a telegraph company is quite unlike that of a common
carrier. A common carrier has the exclusive possession and control of
the goods to be carried with peculiar opportunities for embezzlement
or collusion with thieves. The identity of the goods received with those
delivered cannot be mistaken. Their value is capable of easy estimation
6 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Short, 53 Ark. 434, 9 L. R. A. 744, 14 S. W.
694 (1890) (Change of August 17 to August 7); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Crawford, 110 Ala. 460, 20 So. 111 (1896) (Change of word eighth to eighty);
Walker v. Western Union Tel. Co., 75 S. C. 512, 56 S. E. 38 (1906) (Message
was "Toots desperately ill; convulsions. Better come" was finally delivered as
"Toots desperately; all convulsions better now"); Wertz v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 7 Utah 446, 13 L. R. A. 510, 27 Pac. 172 (1891) (I will give you one
thousand cash ball, six month; Answer. was delivered as reading "I will give
one hundred cases balc, 6 months, Answer").
7 Whereby a constitutional or statutory provision, a telegraph company is
made or treated as a common carrier, a stipulation as to unrepeated message is
against public policy and void. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Wells, 82 Miss. 733,
35 So. 190 (1903) (change in cipher message of "alike" into "alive"); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Eubanks, 100 Ky. 591, 36 L. R. A. 711, 66 Am. St. Rep. 361,
38 S. W. 1068 (1897) (Message received as sent to "J. A. Russell," instead of
"J. W. Russell," as directed and thus delayed in delivery); Postal Tel. Cable
Co. v. Schaefer, 110 Ky. 709, 62 S. W. 1119 (1901) (Message offering potatoes
at $1.70 per barrel was delivered as offering them at $1.07 per barrel); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Beal, 56 Neb. 415, 71 Am. St. Rep. 682, 76 N. W. 903 (1899)
(Seven hundred and ninety dollars changed into "even hundred ninety dollars");
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Meek, 49 Ind. 53 (1874) (Terms of a proposition
seriously changed and name of sender entirely disfigured).
8 Bank of Ky. v. Adams Express, 93 U. S. 115 (1876); Hart v. Penna. R. R.,
112 U. S. 338 (1884); N. J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchant Bank, 6 How.
344 (1848); Southern Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wail 246 (1874); Railroad
Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall 123 (1874).
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and may be ascertained by inquiry of the consignor, and the carrier's
compensation fixed accordingly; and his liability in damage is measured
by the value of the goods. A telegraph company is intrusted with
nothing but an order qr a message which is to be transmitted or repeated by electricity.
Rules and regulations stipulating against mistakes and delays in
transmission are valid in view of the uncertainties attendant on the
delivery of messages by means of electricity, and the difficulties in the
way of guarding against errors and delays in the performance of
such a service.9 It is just and reasonable that, the conductor of a
telegraph should require that additional precautions should be taken
to ascertain the accuracy of the messages as received, at the request
and expense of the parties interested if they intend to hold im responsible in damages for any mistakes.1 0 There is nothing in the
regulation which tends to embarass or hinder the free use of the
telegraph or to impose on those having occasion to transmit or receive
messages any onerous or impracticable duty. A mistake in its transmi.,;ion might occasion no serious damage to the parties interested.
Whether it would do so or not would be within the knowledge of the
sender or receiver, rather than within that of the operator who transmits it. The latter could rarely be expected to know what would be
the consequences of an error in its transmission. The sender knows
the occasion and the subject of the message. He can best judge the
consequences attendant upon any mistake in sending it, to determine
whether it is of a nature to render a repetition necessary to ascertain
its accuracy instead of throwing this burden on the owner or conductor of the telegraph, who cannot be supposed to know the effect
of a mistake or the consequences in damages of a failure to transmit
it correctly."
Some of the courts which are in accord with the majority rule
say there is no valid contract between the telegraph company and
the sender relative to liability for negligence in the transmission of a
message by the company. They assert, where is the consideration for
the contract? It does not move from the company. On the contrary,
the company demands from the sender of the message fifty per cent in
addition to the usual price for sending it for repeating. A contract
by the company limiting its liability for negligence, mistake, or delay
is not a contract of any legal effect. A common carrier receives a
9 Grinnell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299 (1873); Clement v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 137 Mass. 463 (1884); Primrose v. Western Tel. Co.,
154 U. S. 1 (1893); M'Andrew v. The Electric Co., 33 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 180

(1900).
10

11

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525 (1867).
Ellis v. American Tel. Co., 13 Allen 226 (1886).
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valuable consideration for such a contract by reduction in freight
charges. A telegraph company does not receive a valuable consideration
12
for a contract of this character.
If there is such a contract limiting liability of the company the
sender has entered into it under a species of moral duress. His
necessities compelled him to resort to the telegram, and he was compelled to submit to such conditions. It was so argued by the Illinois
court.'3
The sender of a message gets sufficient notice of the conditions
and stipulations on the back of the telegram. There is usually printed
at the foot of the message blanks Read the notice and agreement on
14
the back.
It is argued that the sender often never reads the printed "conditions and agreement" thus subscribed. But it does not follow from
this that they are not bound by the conditions. It was negligence not
to read them before signing and delivery of the message. The sender
should not be permitted to shut his eyes, and refuse to see what was
so plainly before him. To allow this would operate as a fraud upon
the telegraph company. It would enable one party through his negligence to create a liability against another in his favor when none
was bargained for.
A shipper is bound by the terms and conditions in a bill of lading
whether he reads it or not.1 5 He cannot avoid its effect by showing
that he executed it hurriedly or without due care or that he was ignorant of its contents. 16 Why not apply the same rule to the sender of
a telegram?
The advertised time table of a railroad has been held part of a
general offer. It becomes binding when accepted by a purchaser
whether he reads it or not. The law requires him to inquire and
exercise diligence. 17 Why not require the sender of a message to use
Tyler v. Western Union Tel. Co., 60 Ill. 421 (1871).
13 Tyler v. Western Union Tel. Co., op. cit., supra note 12. Contra: Primrose
v. Western Union Tel. Co., op. cit., supra note 4.
'4
Breese v. U. S. Tel. Co., 45 Barbour 274, 48 N. Y. 141 (1871); Francis
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 N. W. 1078 (1894).
15 Jolnstine v. Richmond R. Co., 39 S. C. 55, 17 S. E. 512 (1893); Inman
v. Seaboard Aire R. Co., 159 Fed. 960 (1908); Herring v. Atlantic Coast Line,
160 N. C. 252, 76 S. E. 527 (1912).
16 St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Ladd, 33 Okl. 160, 124 Pac. 461 (1912); Nashville
R. Co. v. Stone, 112 Tenn. 348, 79 N. W. 1031 (1899); Bethea v. Northeastern
R. Co., 26 S. C. 91, 1 S. E. 372 (1887); Caw v. Texas Pac. R. R. Co., 194 U. S.
427, 24 Sup. Ct. R. 663, 48 Law Ed. 1053 (1903); Adams Express Co. v Carnaban, 29 Ind. App. 606, 63 N. E. 245, 64 N. E. 647 (1902); Grace v. Adams, 100
Mass. 505, 97 Am. Dec. 117, 1 Am. R. 131, (1886).
17 Denton v. Great North. R. R., 5 E. & B. 860 (1867); Shears v. Eastern
R. R. Co., 14 Allen 433, 92 Am. Dec. 280, (1867); Coleman v. Railroad Co.,
138 N. C. 351, 50 S. E. 690 (1905).
12
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the same care? When a person receives sufficient notice of the conditions and stipulations on,the back of a telegram and sends it without
objection, it is reasonable for the operator to assume that the sender
assented to such an agreement. An acceptance to a contract*can be
made by acts as well as words.1 8
Professor Williston says that "One who writes a telegraphic message on a blank, offered by the company which contains printed terms
and conditions is bound by them in so far as they are not violations
of public policy." 19
The public are notified of the terms of the telegram. Without this
precaution of repeating messages, mistakes by telegraph companies
are unavoidable. There is no principle of public policy which does or
should permit a telegraph company from being prudent enough to
protect themselves from ruin, by requiring such a condition in the
transmission of messages.
The minority rule is in accordance with the main principles of
damages. This rule is emphasized in the case of Hadley v. Baxendale,20 ever since considered a leading case on both sides of the Atlantic, and approved and followed by Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Company,21 and Howard v. Stillwell.22 Lord Baron Alderson
laid down as the principles by which the jury ought to be guided
in estimating the damages arising out of any breach of contract, the
following: "Where two parties have made a contract which one of
them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive
in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly
and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according
to the usual course of things from such a breach of contract itself
or .such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of -both parties, at the time they made the contract, -as the
probable result -of the breach." -The same rule of damages has been
company to transmit or .deliver a
applied, upon failure of a telegraph
28
cipher message in many instances.
WITTSTQN. ON CONTRACTS, VOL..1, pp. .?/; 46.
WIIZ.STON oN CONTRACTS, vol. 1, p. 159.
20 "V Exch. 354 (1854).
.21 Op; cit., supra-note 3.
22 139 U. S. 199 (1890).
28 Candee v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 Wis. 471, 479-481 (1874); Beaupre
.

19

€.Pac. & Ati. Tel. Co., 21 Minn. 155 (1874); Mackay v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 16 Nevada 222 (1889); Daniel v. Western Union Tel. Co., 61 Texas 452
(1884); Cannon v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 N. C. 300, 6 S. E. 731 (1888);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wilson, 32 Fla. 527 (1885); Abeles v. Western Union

Tel. Co., 37 Mo. App. 554 (1889).
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CONCLUSION: The minority rule should be urged and extended
because:
a. Liability of a telegraph company is unlike that of a common
carrier.
b. A telegraph company has no control over electrical apparatus
and atmospheric conditions.
c. It makes the sender of a message vigilant and careful about
entering into a contract.
d. It is in accord with the main rules of damages.
Johm M. Ruberto.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-THE ABOLITION OF NONSENSE IN CRIMINAL

PLEADING.-The large number of convictions for murder Which have
been reversed by appellate courts for defects in the indictment or information have brought unfavorable comment upon the courts. 'Everyone at all familiar with criminal procedure has noticed the cumbrous
and complicated forms of indictment and information intended to
charge the crime of murder in the first degree. It is interesting to
note that in Nichols v. State,' the Supreme Court of Nebraska approved a form suggested by Judge Rose of that court, which was as
follows:
"'In the District Court for Cheyenne County, Nebraska.
"'The State of Nebraska, Plaintiff, v. Charles Nichols, Defendant.
"'Allen E. Warren, the duly elected, qualified and acting
county attorney of Cheyenne county, Nebraska, prosecuting pursuant to law in the name of and for the state of Nebraska, plaintiff, makes information to the district court for Cheyenne county
in session October 17, 1921, at the regular October term of that
year, as follows:
" 'In Cheyenne county, Nebraska, June 17, 1921, Charles
Nichols, defendant, feloniously, purposely and of his deliberate and
premeditated malice, shot Emma Carow with a revolver, and as a
result thereof she died June 17, 1921. Defendant thus committed
murder in the first degree.
Allen E. Warren,
County Attorney of Cheyenne
County, Nebraska.
1

109 Neb. 335, 191 N. W. 333 (1922).

NOTES
" 'The State of Nebraska, County of Cheyenne-ss.:
"'Allen E. Warren, being duly sworn according to law, says
the facts stated in the foregoing information are true as he verily
believes.
Allen E. Warren,
County Attorney of Cheyenne
. County, Nebraska.
"'Subscribed in my presence and sworn to before me October
17, 1921.
"'[SEAL] Isola B. Wasson,
Clerk of the District Court of
Cheyenne County, Neb."'
The above form of information for first degree murder was approved
2
again by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Pkegley v. State.
William M. Cain.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.
SURETYSHIP-STATUTE op FRAuDs-"MAiN PuRposE" RuLE.-In
*the case of Witschard v. A. Brody and Sons, Inc.,' the defendant
Buckley contracted with defendant Brody and Sons, Inc., to perform
certain work on the premises of the latter, in making excavations,
building walls and laying concrete floorings. For necessary lumber
supplied to the job the defendant became indebted to the plaintiff,
Westbury Company, and, plaintiff refused to supply more lumber
until he was paid. A member of the firm of Brody and Sons orally
told the plaintiff that if they "continued to deliver the balance of
materials needed on that job he would guarantee payment of what
had already been delivered and what was to be delivered in the
future." The Westbury Company thereupon resumed deliveries to
Buckley, and the bill remaining unpaid the plaintiff seeks in this
action to recover the amount of the bill from the Brody Company
upon their oral promise. The New York Court of Appeals considered
this oral promise as one to answbr for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another and unenforceable under the statute of frauds. 2
This court apparently does not adhere to the "Main Purpose Doctrine," which is, briefly, that where the main purpose of the promisor
in making an oral promise of guarantee is to iecure some pecuniary
benefit to himself the promise is not struck by the statute of frauds.
The New York Court says: "The fact'that the Westbury Company,
1

113 Neb. 138, 202 N. W..419 (1925).
177 N. E. 385 (N. Y., 1931).

2
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in continuing its deliveries" to Buckley, at the request of the Brody
Company supplied a consideration for the latter's promise is not
sufficient to make the statute inoperative. To say that the payment
of a consideration removes an oral contract of guarantee from the
application 'of the statute is to say that the statute can never operate,
for there is no such thing as a contract without consideration."
Discussing the "Main Purpose" Rule, Arant on Suretyship says:
"Where the owner of land contracts with P to improve it in some way
and P contracts with C . . . to furnish him materials to be used in

the performance of the contract with the owner, frequently P is unable to make payments as promised and C threatens to . . . furnish
no more materials . . . S, the owner then orally promises C that he
will see that he is paid if he will . . . furnish P with additional materials . . . .The promise of S, under such circumstances, is held by

most courts to be without the statute. . . But, where the purpose of
S is emphasized in determining whether his promise is within the
statute or not, the statute is frequently held to be inapplicable as to
labor or supplies furnished after the promise, but otherwise as to that
which was previously furnished." 3
Courts which follow the "Main Purpose" Rule, however, draw a fine
line of distinction between mere advantage to the promisor and actual,
benefit. For example, the case of Richardson Press v. Albright 4 held
that if a promise by a stockholder in a corporation is merely to answer
for its debt, it is unenforceable under the statute if no sufficient note
or memorandum in writing is made. In this case the defendant was a
large stockholder in a publishing company and orally promised to see
plaintiff paid on the corporation's account. But the plaintiff, creditor,
continued to regdrd the corporation as the principal debtor and attempted to collect bills from it and in plaintiff's action against the
stockholder the court held his promise struck by the statute, saying the
personal pecuniary gain to the promisor was insufficient to constitute
consideration that would make him an original promisor. This question, however, is subject to a division of judicial opinion and there are
many cases holding the other way, especially as to wojrk performed
or materials furnished subsequent to the oral promise. Generally the
benefit to the stockholder is said to be too indirect to support his oral
promise.
In. the case of Taylor v. Lee 5 the defendant was a landlord and,
making arrangements with plaintiff, whereby plaintiff was to. supply
the tenant with materials, the defendant said the tenant would be on
8 AR AT ON SuR=sm1 (HoRNBOOK SERMzS), p. 123.
4 121 N. E. 362, 8 A. L: R. 1195 (N. Y., 1918).
5 121 S. E. 659 (N. C., 1924).

